ment has been slower and they have not yet reached the same degree of intensity of labor which we found in factories. Jews play a great part in commercial life.

Among the lower categories of civil servants, Ukrainians were in the majority from the beginning, while representatives of foreign nationalities increased in the higher services. The average salary of Soviet officials throws little light on the standard of living in this group of the population because the difference between higher and lower employees is again considerable. Incomes in the lower ranks were very small while the higher officials had a life of ease and could on occasion even afford luxury. Engineers are among the most privileged while teachers and actors are much worse off. The legal status of the Soviet official was entirely insecure; they lived constantly under threat of a "purge" or of being denounced as disturbing the process of Soviet economy. The higher ranks of bureaucrats were here in special danger.

The small group of the professional class (doctors, writers, lawyers), in spite of their freedom, was dependent on the apparatus of the Soviet State. The group of outcasts was most to be pitied, i. e. those who had been expelled by the regime from social intercourse, e. g. merchants, artisans, and priests. After identity cards were introduced and "socially dangerous" persons removed, this group greatly decreased.

Another group, finally, is formed by Ukrainians living outside the frontiers of Ukrainian territory, who as "Kurkuls", "Pests", "Saboteurs" were sent to concentration camps in the North and in Siberia. The "Nationalists" are also included in this group. And the colonisation of remote frontier areas in Soviet Russia required forest laborers, miners and factory workers, who had to help in the coal mines of Siberia and in building up industrial concerns in Central Asia. It is impossible to give statistics for the proportion of Ukrainians in this group, but they cannot be ignored as they will certainly return home and play an important rôle in Ukraine whenever the general situation is altered.

In Ukrainian areas outside of the Soviet Union, conditions resemble those obtaining in Western Europe. The Ukrainian

the New Russian Governments) there were over 1 million hectares under beetroot. Just before the last war the annual production of beet in the Ukraine reached 150 million quintals: i.e. 18 per cent of world production. The production of Ukrainian beet sugar ranked fourth—after that of America, Germany and France. In 1913 the Ukraine produced 11 million quintals of crystallized sugar. This output, together with that of the Polish factories, covered all the needs of the internal market (which during the preceding twenty-five years had augmented fourfold) and provided substantial surplus for export to the Baltic and the Middle East.

In addition to the beet processing plants, about 60 per cent of the alcohol refineries (corn, potatoes) of the Empire were located in the Ukraine. The production of vegetable oil (particularly from sunflower seed) was also important.

It has been estimated by the Soviet paper *Pravda* that approximately 1 milliard of rubles a year was paid for services on the semi-industrialized estates of landowners throughout Russia: of this sum a considerable proportion was paid for the hire of horse transport (since landowners did not maintain a large number of draught horses but hired from the villages). Of this milliard, about 300,000,000 were paid out in the Ukraine. As the peasant population of the Ukraine numbered about fifteen millions, some 20 rubles a year per head of the population was earned on 'supplementary' work on the large estates. 'Only owing to the sugar and other agricultural industries could the dense population of the Ukraine exist in such comparatively well-to-do circumstances.'

Thus the agricultural economy of Podolia, Volhynia, Kiev, Chernigov and Poltava was based only partly on the production of cereals. With a population which reached nearly twenty millions, only about 2 million hectares were under wheat, while in New Russia, with a population about half that of the Ukrainian Governments, there were 4 million hectares under wheat. The Ukraine exported only small quantities of wheat to Poland and White Russia, which provinces drew the bulk of their supplies from New Russia. The real 'granaries' of Russia which supplied the whole Empire and exported a surplus abroad were the regions of the northern Caucasus and Trans-Volga with western Siberia and New Russia (including the Governments of Kherson and Ekaterinoslav with the northern part of Tauris and the southern part of Kharkov) In those regions the black earth really had a virgin quality during the first half of the nineteenth century; and its richness remains exceptional even now.

As a rule, the climatic conditions in the *New Russian Governments*

These measures were so vigorously applied that it has been estimated 651
that by the end of 1932, some 2,400,000 persons had been removed 241
from Ukraine to parts unknown. These were naturally the more 661
prosperous, the more progressive and energetic persons who had profited by the New Economic Policy and had accumulated some capital.

The forcing of the peasants into the collective farms and the 185
prohibition of almost all possibilities for the securing of raw ma- 433
terials had a further effect. Under the older system, the Ukrainian 511
peasants had time, during the winter especially, to work at home and to supply themselves most of their need for manufactured articles. They were able to work in leather and in cloth and wood. This was now rendered impossible, for the individual plots were too small to furnish the necessary raw materials and the peasants were forced, if they would satisfy their most immediate needs, to rely upon the goods turned out by the state factories. These goods were always inferior in quality and short in quantity, for the whole point of the Five Year Plan was to develop heavy industry as rapidly as possible and the government took no interest in seeing that the villages were supplied with consumers' goods. It concentrated its attention on those branches which could be of use in military preparations. Even when petitions were made by the Soviets in Odesa and Kharkiv for permission to establish textile factories, they were peremptorily told that the plan provided for the establishment of such plants only in selected parts of the RSFSR. Thus to the local shortage was added the costs of distant transportation, which made the price prohibitive even for the goods that were received.

In 1931 almost the entire grain reserves were removed from 651
Ukraine and the peasants had nothing to carry over, and when in 685
1932 there came a drought in the Ukrainian Soviet Republic, the 241
peasants had no supplies. 511

This did not bother the authorities. During 1931 and 1932 they collected from the peasants all that they could. The next step was to tighten the laws.

On August 6, 1932 the TsK VKP/b and the Soviet of Com-

[1929-1930 -1st Five Year Plan -- Analyst]

651 missars issued a decree for the "protection of socialist property."
685 Under this law the stealing of a single ear of grain from a kolhosp
241 granary could be punished by confinement for ten years in a con-
511 centration camp. It was so interpreted that if a peasant picked up a single stalk from the field after the harvest, he was liable for the same punishment. In other words, the peasant could only secure his grain legally from and through the administration of the kolhosp.

With this law on the books, the Ukrainian collective farms could be punished either for failing to protect "socialist property" or they could be attacked for failing to present to the government crops and grain in an amount equal to that foreseen by the plan. This was the easier because there were few of the kolhosps that had been able to sow the area required of them. Lack of intelligent and competent leadership on the farms and the exigencies of the weather made it almost inevitable that there would be deficiencies, especially since the schedules were made up in Moscow and took no account of the local conditions.

As the grain deliveries lagged, the demands increased and on January 24, 1933, the Central Committee of the VKP/b issued a new resolution that "it was regarded as proved that the party organization of Ukraine had not carried out the tasks assigned to it in organizing grain deliveries and executing the grain plan."

To remedy this, the central authorities ordered the formation of political detachments in the machine tractor stations, "the chief basic tasks of which were the insuring of the unconditional and immediate execution by the kolhosps and their members of all their obligations to the state and especially the decisive struggle with the stealing of kolhosp property, the struggle with the manifestations of sabotage of the income of the party and the government in the sharing of the grain supplies and the meat products of the kolhosps."

The leaders of these detachments were given the obligation "to secure the constant lawful and accurate fulfilment of the laws of the Soviet government by administrative and criminal measures against the organizers of the stealing of Soviet property and the

sabotage of the income of the party and the government in the branch of village agriculture." 651 685

The machine tractor stations were staffed by men largely alien to the Ukrainian countryside. The more fanatical Communists were placed in these political detachments and were, in effect, told to supplement or replace the local administration in the exercise of pressure and terror upon both the heads and the members of the kolhosps. To aid them in their work Moscow sent to Ukraine a Russian Pavel Postyshev as a special plenipotentiary of the Central Committee with 7,000 party workers from the Russian Republic. 241 511

The work of these special "commissions" and "brigades" was marked by the utmost severity. They entered the villages, and made the most thorough searches of the houses and barns of every peasant. They dug up the earth, broke into the walls of buildings and the stoves in which the peasants tried to hide their last handfuls of food. They even in places took specimens of the fecal matter from the toilets in the effort to learn in that way by analysis whether the peasants had stolen government property and were eating grain. Wherever they found any, the peasants were severely punished, while the detachments carried off not only grain but everything edible.

The same reports came from every corner of Ukraine. "They requisitioned everything that could be eaten" was the report from the village of Zorich in the district of Poltava. In one village in the district of Odesa, "they collected all the grain, potatoes, beets to the last kilogram" and in other places they even took half-baked loaves of bread from the stove. In at least one of these commissions, Molotov, then head of the Council of Ministers, took a personal part.

The natural result was a famine of unprecedented severity. The villages had been hungry in the autumn. After these searches commenced, they literally starved. An Englishman, M. Magridge, wrote in the *Fortnightly Review* for May, 1933: "During a recent visit to Ukraine, I have seen a little of the war which the Soviet government is carrying on against the peasants. The fields were 731 661

[result of excessive grain requisitions in 1933 -- Analyst]

433 methods, new possibilities. Their actions were interpreted as merely
185 a defiance of the central government, a new case of wrecking or
656 of sabotage and were treated accordingly. In the first rush of collectivization, the network of agricultural centres that had been developed in Ukraine during the twenties as a responsible answer to the local appreciation of the problem was wiped out and most of their leaders paid the penalty for their temerity in standing by their own studies and their own achievements.

[432] There were only the slightest concessions finally made to the peasants. They were allowed to sell a certain amount of the surplus grain to the government at a somewhat higher price. The individual families were allowed to possess about an acre of land on which they could raise their own produce, provide their winter food as a result of their own labors and they were allowed to sell their own produce in what may best be described as a legalized black market, but this meant merely the privilege to sell themselves in some of the larger local centres, and to many of these they were allowed to go only if they secured the appropriate permits from the heads of the collective farms and the local representatives of the NKVD.

●[511] Even these slight concessions, while they could not bring prosperity to the peasants on the collective farms, rendered it possible for them to keep body and soul together despite the steadily dropping standard of living and the almost complete lack of consumer goods which were furnished in quantity only to the inhabitants of the more favored regions, as Moscow and Leningrad. At the same time, the peasants felt, ever more bitterly, the fact that the new conditions of living prevented almost all those home manufactures which in the earlier period had enabled them to compensate in some degree for the lack of proper articles of industry.

166 There was thus a growing material impoverishment of the
626 village communities and a loss of the old spontaneity and gaiety that had marked Ukraine even under the hardest conditions of the past. Attempts were made to utilize this for forcing peasants to leave the villages and join the industrial masses in the cities and work in the new plants. Others were encouraged to leave the

½ [after 1933 famine + Russification -- Analyst]

341 lected for the tax in kind. This was a negligible sum and the
651 average member rarely received more than one ruble per labor
474 day. This sum was, of course, insufficient to provide for the
465 goods which the family needed to purchase, and since their share
● [511] of the grain was rarely sufficient to feed them, their situation became hopeless, while of other products the individual received about one litre of oil, fifty kilograms of potatoes, thirty-five kilograms of fruit, and five-tenths kilograms of meat and fat.

[435] The real significance of these figures is shown in the prices that were charged in the state stores.[1] There a kilogram of bread cost ninety kopecks, ten eggs brought eight rubles, a kilogram of beef twenty-four rubles, and a pair of boots four hundred and fifty rubles, while a farmer's suit of clothes cost five hundred rubles.

[422] It made the peasant really dependent upon his individual plot of land if he was to secure any necessities.[1] This was far too small and its use was bound with many restrictions. Thus, no family was allowed to hold more than one cow and two calves, one sow, up to ten goats, an undefined number of chickens and up to twenty beehives. In the beginning it was possible for the peasant to secure a certain amount of food for these animals from the common store. He was allowed to retain the manure and it was thus possible for him to improve his own individual plot and thus to secure larger returns. It was a liberal application of such principles that had rendered possible the general improvement which was noticeable during the years 1934-6, when the government was endeavoring to make the system of collective farms workable.

It can be easily seen that the system of allowing individual incomes was based on a principle opposite that of the New Economic Policy, for it would require scarcely a legislative enactment to reduce these amounts while the New Economic Policy presented a norm of profit to the workers. Yet with each year, once the government was convinced of its success, it found it possible in various ways to tap this new source of income for its own purposes.

The favorite method was by taxation. Thus, by 1939 if we should assume that the average family received in cash four hun-

1 [Ukraine - after 1933 famine -- Analyst]

dred and eighty karbovantsy, they would be required to pay twenty-two and a half karb. in taxes, twenty in rent, fifty as a special tax and they would be required to volunteer to take at least two hundred in government bonds.

Even this did not cover the total payments to the government. With its usual love of double-talk and subterfuge, the government, which controlled every branch of human activity in the USSR, talked of the establishment of socialism and levied indirect taxes on all transactions so that the actual cost to the villagers of any manufactured article was about three times what it cost the government as producer. The whole subject was carefully veiled as a state secret to protect the Soviet Union against capitalist intrigues but the unfortunate population were the unwilling contributors to this new order of life.

Under such conditions it is extremely difficult to pierce the veil of percentages as to cost and production and give a reliable estimate as to the amount of money received for the government or the relationship between the sums spent in maintaining the operation of the Moscow-controlled factories in Ukraine and the amount spent upon the needs of the population either individually, as families or as citizens of the UkSSR or of the UkSSR as a governmental unity within the Soviet sphere. From those figures which the Soviet has let out, it is possible to see that the yearly budget of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic has run from 2½-5% of the budget of the USSR while the population has been at least 18% of the total population.

With the villages compelled to yield the last pound of grain, etc., that could be extracted by force, and receiving in return almost no manufactured goods, the position of the city workmen and the intelligentsia was little better. The wages of the workmen were always insufficient, the housing conditions were hardly endurable, and the only point of betterment was that the larger places and some of the plants especially favored by the regime received more manufactured goods of a poor quality and at a high price which the fortunate people might be able to secure.

369 They could also, if they still had preserved any valuables, dispose
● 511 of them through the Torgsin stores which sold imported wares for foreign currency and precious metals.

[554] Of course, neither in city or village did any of these restrictions apply to the more important Communists who possessed their own stores at which the government supplied them with the necessary articles to allow them to live in comfort and luxury as a welcome investment for the regime. The line of demarcation between the poor and the rich, the ordinary people and the Communists, became steadily greater, until it was often wider than it had been in the old tsarist Russian empire.

642 All these measures which had been adopted in Moscow were
631 in theory supposed to apply to all sections of the USSR equally, but it was not long before the natives of Ukraine realized that however impartial the laws might seem, they were not sufficiently flexible to take account of local and republican differences. The central regime was interested in advancing and developing the Moscow industrial area and it expended on this in various grandiose efforts, as the Moscow subway, enormous sums of money. It is safe to say that the expenditures in that one area alone equalled the entire budget and money spent by the central government in the Ukrainian Soviet Republic. It classified Ukraine as one of the regions where the supply of manufactured goods was less necessary.

The crushing of the Ukrainian Communists, the suicide of Khvylovy and Skrypnyk, no less than the complete altering of the land code of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic and the substitution of the new policy of collectivization, showed perfectly well where the real power of the USSR lay in the thirties and it was accompanied by such acts as the introduction of Russian as the [701] standard language of instruction and of the army. This was followed by the formal transfer of the Ukrainian divisions to the Red Army and a number of other acts which completed the subordination of the UkSSR. Already in 1930, during difficulties on the Soviet-Manchuria borders, the Red Army had not hesitated to

[after 1933 - measures dealing with production, supply etc. - this ...]

668* 182 alien aspects of life in the city. A certain number of local Ukrainians accepted this campaign enthusiastically, sometimes carrying it further than the newcomers themselves. Others, although Ukrainian by background, had long been used to employing the Russian language and associating freely with persons of Russian ethnic origin. Consequently, the "purifying" process meant in many cases serious disruption of their accepted way of living and social relationships.

Because of the extreme importance of this factor it is worth describing in some detail a case which provides a striking illustration of the Nationalist psychology during this period. It is contained in the diary of a prominent Kiev author, Arkadii Liubchenko, who was evacuated by the Soviet forces but managed to remain in Kharkov until the German arrival. He then made contact with the Mel'nyk groups (which, as was previously pointed out, pursued the same policy there as in Kiev). Always nationalist, he soon became an enthusiastic convert to the creed of integral nationalism. In December, through his association with the Nationalists, he obtained a post on the Kharkov newspaper, *Nova Ukraïna*. Shortly afterwards, a Kharkov writer named Filipov appeared in the editorial offices; he told Liubchenko that he had prepared an article on the evils of the Communist regime which he wished to publish. When Liubchenko turned it down because it was written in Russian, Filipov protested that his mother had been Ukrainian and that he would submit the article in Ukrainian, as the question of language was indifferent to him. This brought the sneering reply that real Ukrainians, such as those dominating *Nova Ukraïna*, could have nothing to do with one who could not make up his mind whether he was a Ukrainian or a Russian, since such a person was an "internationalist" just like the Bolsheviks.[29] It may easily be imagined what effect such ideas had upon the rebuffed applicant. This is especially the case, since work for an organ like the newspaper was for many not merely a matter of prestige, or even of expression of opinion, but of life and death. With the rapidly deteriorating food situation in Kiev and Kharkov, employment by an agency which was recognized by

511 668

[29] Arkadii Liubchenko, *Shchodennyk* (Diary), Vol. I, ed. M. Dmytrenko (Toronto: Novi Dni, 1951), p. 25.

6: Armstrong S-4 (no date) 1955 RD1 Ukraine RD1

the Germans, and hence able to issue ration cards and provide a small income, was indispensable for most intellectuals.[30]

In view of these circumstances, it is not surprising that the German enemies of the Nationalist movement felt that the time was ripe to destroy its prestige by an attack on its principal organ. On December 12, 1941, the SP force seized *Ukraïns'ke Slovo* and arrested all the leading editorial workers, including Rohach, Chemeryns'kyi and Oliïnyk.[31] Kandyba, too, was arrested, but by native police in a city *raion* (ward) controlled by the OUN-M; this circumstance allowed him to escape.[32]

Two days later the newspaper reappeared, as *Nove Ukraïns'ke Slovo,* but with a quite different editorial policy. The new editor was Constantine Shtepa, acting rector of the University of Kiev. Of Ukrainian origin, he had been an officer in the tsarist army and, although strongly anti-Soviet, remained a pronounced Russian patriot, desiring the acceptance of the Russian culture and language throughout the Ukraine and the maintenance of governmental ties with Moscow. Consequently, he was a bitter enemy of the Ukrainian nationalist movement.[33] The first issue of his paper contained an article, inspired by the Germans, but acceptable to Shtepa, in which the Nationalists were vigorously attacked for turning what "should have been an informational journal into an organ of their group." The Nationalists, it explained, had refused to heed German warnings that the paper must serve the whole community; consequently Shtepa had taken charge to "popularize" it. What this meant, was clarified by an article on the second page which demanded "work instead of politics."[34]

Under Shtepa's administration, *Nove Ukraïns'ke Slovo* became extremely subservient to the Germans. In part this was due to the extreme severity and alertness of the German censorship; the edi-

[30] Interview 59. Liubchenko himself (Liubchenko, pp. 60 ff.), when the shoe was on the other foot and he was compelled to seek work in Kiev, found this to be the case.

[31] *OUN u Viini,* p. 73.

[32] L. Dniprova in *Ukraïns'ke Slovo* (Paris), June 18, 1950, p. 3.

[33] Record of interrogation of an editor in Kiev, early 1943, who was a specialist in ancient history, the author of *Die Völkerwanderung* and *Das römische Recht* (CXLVa 78, in Centre de Documentation Juive Contemporaine) (hereafter referred to as CXLVa 78). The only person fitting this description is Constantine Shtepa.

[34] These articles are reprinted in *Ukraïns'ka Diiisnist',* January 5, 1942, p. 2.

464 [166] districts through the long winter has led to the creation of a large class who migrate according to the season, working for wages on the land in summer and moving to the towns in search of work in winter. A slight permanent movement to the towns is in progress, but the rate is not rapid. As the Little Russians are not naturally energetic or industrious, the supply of labour for industries other than agriculture is not equal to the demand, and immigration from other parts of Russia is continuous. The heavier classes of work in the industries of the Donets and Krivoy-Rog regions are seldom undertaken by the natives of the [563] country. The underground labour of the mines and the foundry work is done mainly by Great Russians, who come from the Governments of Smolensk, Orel, • [511] Kursk, Mohilev, and Simbirsk. The port labour at Odessa and Nikolaev has attracted a population of mixed nationality with a low standard of living, who exist between seasons in a state of semi-starvation.

464 221 In the agricultural world labour is fairly plentiful, but the neglect to cultivate such lands as are not suitable for cereals has led to a summer immigration of Bulgarians, who raise fine crops of vegetables and ground fruits on low-lying land, supplying not only the neighbourhood but far distant towns. These immigrants return home in winter.

167 There is no great permanent emigration from the Ukraine except among the population in the region of the upper Dnieper, a fair number of whom leave for the Polish industrial districts owing to bad conditions at home.

(b) *Labour Conditions*

466 511 565 Labour conditions cannot be called good in any branch of industry. The State makes no effort to regularize the supply and very little to better the conditions of labour. The landless agricultural proletariat, which is increasing steadily, lives in a hand-to-mouth fashion, and its position is gradually growing worse. Lacking energy and ability, individuals of

9: Prothero G-4 (no date) 1920 RD1 Ukraine RD1

this class are often compelled to accept badly-paid work in the towns, and both men and women have often to make long and laborious journeys on foot in search of employment.

A large class engaged in domestic industries, whether as masters or as servants, make a very poor living, frequently working very long hours under bad sanitary conditions.

In the coal and iron industries there are some concerns, particularly those capitalized from abroad, which look well after their work-people, provide housing, secure good supplies of provisions at moderate prices, and take other measures to ameliorate labour conditions. In consequence, however, of works and mines being often situated on land rented on short-term leases, many employers cannot afford to lay out money on such objects, and conditions for labour are generally bad. So difficult is it to attract labour, that mine-owners have sometimes sought to secure convict labour from the Government.

The peculiar characteristic of labour in the Ukraine is its mobility, which often occasions unexpected crises. Superstition, epidemics of disease, and more obscure causes lead to vast movements of labourers from a district at very short notice.

The *artels*, which are labour organizations peculiar to Russia, have an important influence on the supply and quality of certain labour. An *artel* is an association of workers, the general principles of which are: (1) all members must be actual workers; (2) all have equal rights in the organization; and (3) every member is responsible for the obligations contracted by the *artel*. The organization is usually non-capitalistic or has a very small capital.

In general there are two classes of *artels*, those of workers in producing trades and those of workers who provide service. The former are engaged in carpentering, cabinet-making, printing, linen-weaving, dairy-work, fishing, &c. The second group comprises stevedores, packers, customs agents, bank porters, com-

9: Prothero G-4 (no date) 1920 RD1 Ukraine RD1

421 425 Land tenure in the Ukraine is at present in an unstable state. The principal factors affecting it are two legal enactments, the first being the law of 1861 abolishing serfdom and providing for the ownership of land by peasants, who previously had held none, and the second being the Stolypin law of 1906 modifying the principle of communal ownership in peasant lands. The law of 1861 provided for land to be taken from private estates and handed over to peasants on a deferred purchase system. The land was not assigned to individuals, but to *mirs* (local communes), which divided it up for cultivation. The law also provided for periodical redistributions of this land, which is known always as the *nadyel* or endowment land. At the present time a good deal of *nadyel* land in the Governments of Poltava and Chernigov is held by individual peasant owners, but elsewhere it is all owned by communes. A peculiar principle of this system is the mutual responsibility of all members of the commune for its legal and financial obligations, even should a member have forsaken the locality and the practice of agriculture.

425 ●511 The great defect of the distribution of 1861 is that it is based on the rural population of that date, with no machinery for providing additional land in proportion to the natural increase of population, which has been very rapid. Two evil results have followed. First, at the periodical redistributions of *nadyel* land the amount available per head has steadily decreased. The holdings have therefore tended to become uneconomical, and a consequent impoverishment of the peasants has taken place, with the natural concomitants of arrears of rent and taxes and an increased burden of debt on the land. Secondly, efforts to purchase or rent further land from private proprietors, in order to increase the available *nadyel* land or supply the wants of prosperous peasants who wish to buy new farms, has led to an enormous increase in the price and rent of land, a rise of three times being frequent and a tenfold rise occasional. To

9: Prothero G-4 (no date) 1920 RD1 Ukraine RD1

alleviate these conditions various measures have been adopted, such as the easement or complete extinguishing of the burden of the purchase-price of the *nadyel*, the prevention of its frequent redistribution, and the founding of the Peasants' Land Bank by the State to facilitate further purchases of land by the communes. Nevertheless, a result not looked for by the framers of the law abolishing serfdom has followed, namely the creation of a large landless agricultural proletariat, which tends to sink in the social scale, to live partly by industry in the towns, and to be migratory in its habits.

The law of 1906 introduced for the first time the general principle of individual and permanent ownership of *nadyel* lands. It aimed at the breaking up of the *mirs* as no longer fulfilling a need, in the expectation that security of tenure by the individual would lead to a more rational and successful system of cultivation. The period since the promulgation of the law is too short to allow of sound conclusions as to its effect.

The *nadyel* lands are almost entirely cultivated on the three-field system, each unit of land being planted one year with a winter-sown grain, the following year with a spring-sown grain, and lying fallow in the third year. This method causes a disastrous impoverishment of the land, especially as in many cases the minimum of manure, whether animal or chemical, is used. An alternative method must be introduced, or the productiveness of the black-soil land under peasant ownership will continue to shrink as heretofore.

The land held by private owners is in general their perpetual freehold, and can be roughly divided into that held by the nobility in large estates and the smaller holdings purchased from them since the abolition of serfdom by prosperous peasants and others desirous of embarking on agriculture on their own account. There are also a number of foreign colonists, chiefly Germans, descendants of those introduced into the country

24: Cech and Mellon S-2 (no date) 1944 Ukrainians-Ruthenians

Shepherds blow huge horns to round up their sheep by night

511/464 In the narrow valleys and on their slopes are cottages and straggling villages where the Ruthenian uplanders live. Nearly all the huts are made of wood and are flanked by gardens with patches of sunflowers. 241 In the higher altitudes the land consists mainly of meadows, and such 311 meagre fields as there are yield scanty crops of oats, potatoes or hemp—not sufficient to live on. No wonder that during the summer months it is chiefly women and children who can be found at home; the menfolk either fell trees in the forest or earn their living as seasonal labourers in the towns and villages of the more prosperous South.

101 These lonely mountains and forests breed a people with a distinct 162 character of their own. Living as they do in seclusion, they not only differ from their Slovak neighbours but show distinct regional differences

among themselves. They can be divided into three well-defined tribes —the Lemki on the Slovak border, the Boiki in the centre, and the Huculs in the eastern tip of Ruthenia.

The most interesting tribe are the Huculs. They have preserved their tribal characteristics better than their kinsmen. Their standard of education is higher, and they are more conscious and proud of their national individuality. When the Hungarians invaded Ruthenia after the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia, the Huculs offered the stiffest resistance, and during the war they were the core of the partisan force fighting against the totalitarian powers. Like the other Ruthenian mountaineers, the Huculs are largely wood-cutters and raftsmen. But they are distinguished by their skill as carpenters and wood-carvers. This is clearly reflected in their mode of life. Their wooden cottages are neatly built and furnished and impress the visitor by their scrupulous cleanliness. Their tribal individuality and artistic skill find expression in the numerous carvings with which they like to decorate their unpainted houses.

The neighbouring Boiki have also, to some extent, preserved their pride in racial individuality, and their mode of life, though more primitive, has some interesting features. They are kind-hearted, sincere and hospitable, in spite of their poverty. Though less proud than the Huculs, they fly into a temper when crossed, and impulsive outspokenness is one of their traits. They live in cottages and huts which they like to paint in blue and brown, and this makes their exterior rather attractive. But the interior does not always live up to the façade. The better-off Boiki manage to live in fairly decent cottages with two or more rooms, but the huts of the poor often consist of one room only—a dark room with no chimney, one small window, and some roughly made furniture. Some have no bedsteads in the true sense of the word; along the whole wall of the room one may find a long "plank-bed" where the grown-ups sleep at the one end and the children at the other. When the children grow up they sleep on separate beds of the same kind. Unlike the Hucul houses, the Boiki huts have no wooden floors. The domestic animals often share the same room with their masters in winter, sleeping on the bare earth. For many families such a room is therefore a kitchen, living room, bedroom, hall and stable in one.

Much the same applies to the Lemki tribe who live partly on Slovak territory. They are the poorest Ruthenian tribe and their racial character has undergone a certain deterioration. Their standard of life is often appalling, the hygiene leaves much to be desired, and they have the largest number of illiterates, though some improvement has taken place under the Republic.

Mountainous Ruthenia is a country of traditional costumes. The

361 is a wide boulevard bordered with beautiful flowers. Across the river,
341 to the left from a bridge, is a colourful little church in Russian style—a miniature replica of a Moscow *cerkev*—a piece of the Orient in a western setting. It is a delightful building coloured in dull red and white, and has a burnished cupola at the top which reflects the sun in a dazzling blaze. The interesting ikons in the interior match the fairy-tale beauty of its exterior. What a lively contrast to the dignified, twin-spired Greek Catholic cathedral and the surrounding ecclesiastical buildings on the opposite side of the river.

162 There are at least four religions in Užhorod, as well as in other
563 Ruthenian towns, and five languages are spoken there—Ruthenian, Czech, Slovak, Hungarian and Yiddish.

135 While Ruthenia has no mineral wealth comparable to that of
317 Slovakia, it supplies the entire Republic with salt. In the eastern tip of the country, right on the Rumanian frontier, there are huge deposits of mineral salt in the neighbourhood of Slatinské Doly. Although only two mines are now being worked, the annual output amounts to about 120,000 tons of salt. The huge vaulted caves of these mines afford an imposing view from a gallery which rises at a considerable height above the bottom where the miners quarry large blocks of rock-salt, cut them into small blocks, and have them hoisted through the shaft to the surface. The mineral salt which is crushed in a salt-mill is only slightly impure and requires little cleaning.

317 Salt represents the mineral wealth of Carpathian Ruthenia. But it
263 is a commodity which the poor Ruthenian peasants and wood-cutters cannot afford. In order to spice their simple and meagre food the countryfolk journey a day or two to a pool of salt-water to fill a barrel with the liquid salt.

178 To appreciate the degree of progress Carpathian Ruthenia made
511 during the twenty years of its association with Czechoslovakia, one has
185 to bear in mind the condition of this forgotten country when it first appeared on the map as a political unit. The dire poverty, the low standard of education among the majority of the population, lack of cultural amenities, infectious diseases due to abominable sanitary conditions, inadequate communications, economic and political exploitation — all these factors made the life of the Ruthenians under the Carpathian mountains rather desolate.

President Masaryk once said that thirty years of peaceful, reasonable and energetic development would be needed to make the Czechoslovak State secure and happy. Carpathian Ruthenia certainly needed thirty, if not more, years of peaceful, reasonable and energetic development to emerge from her condition of poverty and primitiveness.

744 One of the worst evils was the appalling sanitary conditions in
164 Ruthenia. The rate of infant mortality was among the highest in

24: Cech and Mellon S-2 (no date) 1944 Ukrainians-Ruthenians

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Economic development was essential to a country where bread used to be a delicacy and meat or salt a luxury. The Land Reform introduced in the whole of the Republic in 1919 was a right step in this direction, although the standard of living among the peasant population in the mountainous districts still left something to be desired even during the last years of the Republic. Industrial development, too, was promoted, and 459 factories (timber, food, stone, earthenware, glass, chemicals, electricity, metal, paper) sprang up on Ruthenian territory during the twenty years of freedom. An important factor in the industrial development was the electrification of the country which before 1918 had hardly any electricity. Better road and rail communications, too, assisted in Ruthenia's gradual progress.

The work done in Carpathian Ruthenia under the Republic was a promising beginning. The regrettable setback due to the re-occupation of the country is likely to remain a mere episode. For the resistance of the population and the struggle of the partisans indicate that the Ruthenians are aware of their mission as a free people and that they wish to continue on the path of progress on which they embarked when they decided to become a member of the Czechoslovak Republic.